Investment Leads

You are buying a 20,000-mile fiber backbone and $2B of IPv4 addresses for $1.1B because the market is fixated on a temporary earnings trough.

Cogent acquired Sprint's entire long-haul fiber network for $1. They now own 20,000+ route miles of fiber with 90% physically unique paths, 54 data center facilities, and ~38 million IPv4 addresses worth ~$2B at market rates (carried at $0 on the balance sheet). The stock is down 62% in a year because they cut the dividend 98% to fund the Sprint integration. The market sees a struggling ISP. What it's missing: the wavelength business is scaling from ~$10M to a projected $700M over 7 years at 95% incremental EBITDA margins. Asset liquidation value (IPv4 + fiber replacement cost) is roughly 3x the market cap. Debt is the risk — 6.6x net leverage — but they're actively de-levering. Bull case 5yr: $80-120/share (7-10x from here).

Li Lu — who almost never adds new names to his concentrated 9-stock portfolio — just initiated a ~$54M position in a brand compounder the market is punishing for a fixable acquisition stumble.

Crocs the core brand is healthy and growing internationally with 58% gross margins and $4B revenue. The market is over-punishing the HEYDUDE acquisition struggle, creating a buying opportunity at ~8x forward earnings. Li Lu's investment style is deep fundamental research with multi-year horizons — he held BYD for 20+ years. A new name from him in a 9-stock portfolio is an exceptionally rare signal. AGI-neutral: footwear brands with genuine consumer love aren't displaced by AI. The floor is the core Crocs brand alone (strip out HEYDUDE at zero, Crocs standalone still justifies most of the market cap).

You are buying $2.7B of US residential land for $1.36B — 75 cents on the dollar — backed by D.R. Horton parentage and growing revenue.

Forestar is a residential lot developer (subsidiary of D.R. Horton, the largest US homebuilder). You're buying land at a 25% discount to book value in a country with a structural housing shortage. Land is the original irreplaceable asset — AGI cannot create more of it. Revenue is growing, the business is profitable at 8x P/E, and the D.R. Horton relationship provides operational stability and guaranteed demand for lots. This is the "hardest to lose money on" lead on the entire list.

71 containerships at a 26% discount to book value, generating a 27% free cash flow yield, in an industry where shipyard capacity is maxed out for years.

Preposterously cheap by any metric. Physical world trade does not stop post-AGI — goods still need to move across oceans. The global shipyard orderbook is at multi-decade highs, meaning new supply is constrained for years. At 3.3x earnings and 27% FCF yield, you're getting paid back in ~4 years. The 0.74x book value provides a hard asset floor. The risk is cyclical — shipping rates fluctuate — but at this valuation, a lot of bad news is already priced in.

Trading at 5x adjusted earnings and 0.79x book while buying back 7%+ of shares annually — the GAAP loss is mark-to-market accounting noise, not operational reality.

Jackson sells annuities. The GAAP income statement shows a loss because of mark-to-market hedging on variable annuity guarantees — a non-cash accounting artifact. Adjusted operating EPS is ~$22.67. The company returned $862M to shareholders in 2025 ($634M buybacks + $228M dividends) and guides $900M-$1.1B for 2026. Adjusted book value is $156/share vs. $112 stock price. AGI-neutral: annuities are about mortality tables and interest rates, not knowledge work. Shares outstanding dropped from ~85M to ~67M in 3 years (21% reduction). The mechanical compounding math: at 5x earnings and 7% buyback yield, EPS roughly doubles in 7 years from buybacks alone.

World's largest aircraft lessor at 6.6x earnings, buying back ~10% of shares annually, compounding book value at 13%/year — and you cannot replace 1,700 aircraft overnight.

AerCap owns/manages ~1,700 aircraft leased to 300+ airlines globally. Book value per share has compounded from ~$30 to $113 since 2014. They retired 26% of shares in 3 years (220M → 163M). Physical air travel is one of the things AI truly cannot virtualize — as global GDP grows and more people fly, aircraft lessors benefit. Boeing/Airbus production constraints mean lease rates stay elevated. The $43.7B debt is structural (matched against aircraft assets), not a balance sheet risk in the traditional sense. At current buyback pace, share count drops below 130M within 2 years.

Akre Capital initiated a $198M position in a monopolistic SaaS platform for auto insurance claims — down 38% and a natural AI beneficiary.

CCC connects insurers, repair shops, and parts suppliers in a network that processes ~$100B of annual claims. 99%+ customer retention, $255M FCF, growing revenue. Down 38% in a year, creating Akre's entry. The business is a natural AI beneficiary — claims automation, image-based damage assessment, and fraud detection all improve with AI. Akre is famous for buying quality compounders and holding for decades (their average holding period is 10+ years). A new position from them signals deep conviction in the moat and growth runway.

Owns 130,000 miles of natural gas pipeline — the largest network in the US — and has already signed 4 data center gas supply deals. Priced as a legacy fossil fuel MLP.

Energy Transfer has signed deals with Fermi, Oracle, Entergy/Meta, and CloudBurst totaling 1.9M+ MMBtu/day of contracted gas capacity for data centers. These are 10-20 year take-or-pay contracts — effectively utility-grade cash flow. At 15.7x trailing PE with a 7% distribution yield, the market gives zero credit for the structural demand shift from AI power. The pipeline replacement value is multiples of market cap. $10B+ operating cash flow. Bull case 5yr: $45-55 if data center gas demand doubles (conservative).

You pay 65 cents for every dollar of tanker fleet value. Net cash alone is 32% of market cap. Oil tanker orderbook at historic lows.

Oil tanker fleet valued above market cap, with $806M net cash (32% of market cap) providing a hard floor. The global tanker orderbook is at historic lows, meaning supply is constrained for years. Oil needs to move regardless of AGI — physical transport doesn't get disrupted by software. The combination of below-NAV pricing + net cash + supply constraints creates genuine asymmetry.

Klarman initiated $108M in a government-backed Medicaid managed care business temporarily depressed by post-COVID redetermination. Classic Klarman: buying a durable business during a transient headwind.

Spun out of AIG, now fully independent. Trading at ~6x adjusted earnings, buying back 10%+ of shares annually. $2.6B returned to shareholders in 2025 on a $12.7B market cap = ~20% total yield. Same GAAP-noise dynamic as JXN.

217,000 miles of fiber priced as distressed debt because of Windstream merger complexity, with Elliott Management holding 25% to force value realization. Fiber replacement cost ($12-27B) dwarfs the EV ($12B). But $9.3B debt is real risk.

Akre initiated a 7.1% portfolio position ($647M) in the monopoly CRE data platform, down 60% from highs. Optionality on Homes.com residential expansion. Akre bets big and holds long — this is a major conviction signal.

🏗️ Housing/Construction Convergence

Three independent legendary investors are converging on US housing/construction recovery: Klarman (Eagle Materials EXP, +26% increase to $245M), Tepper (Mohawk MHK, +318% increase), and Berkshire (Pool Corp POOL, new position). This convergence on a single macro theme — housing recovery — from investors who don't coordinate is a strong signal worth tracking. FOR (Forestar) fits this theme perfectly.