EQT Corporation

1. The Core Thesis: Natural Gas as the Bridge Fuel for AI

The Math: How Much Gas Does AI Need?

The math shows 4-6 Bcf/day of incremental gas demand from data centers by 2031. That is meaningful (roughly 4-6% of current US production) but not transformative. Add LNG export growth (15 Bcf/day in 2025 expected to reach 18+ Bcf/day by 2027), and total incremental demand is more substantial.

EIA Forecasts (March 2026 STEO)

The EIA sees modest price increases. This is NOT a structural breakout -- it's slow, steady growth. For EQT to be a 10x, you need to believe the EIA is wrong and gas will go to $5-6+ sustainably.

2. Reserves Deep Dive: What's in the Ground?

Proved Reserves (12/31/2025)

91% of reserves are proved developed -- this is excellent. Proved developed reserves are the most reliable category because they require no additional capital to extract.

Reserve Value at Various Gas Prices

* Estimated by interpolating SEC and strip-price sensitivities. PV-10 grows roughly $10-12B for each $1/Mcf increase in realized price.

Reserve Replacement

EQT is more than replacing what it produces. With 30+ years of drilling inventory (~4,000 gross locations at current pace), this is a multi-decade asset.

Standardized Measure (SEC Methodology)

Notice how dramatically the standardized measure swings with gas prices: from $8.0B at $1.47/Mcf to $21.3B at $2.75/Mcf -- a 2.7x change from a 1.9x change in price. This is the leverage that makes commodity companies both exciting and dangerous.

3. Balance Sheet Deep Dive

Tangible Book Value Analysis

Debt Profile

EQT has been aggressively paying down debt -- from $9.3B peak after the Equitrans merger to $7.8B. At 1.4x Net Debt/EBITDA, leverage is manageable but not low for a cyclical commodity company. A prolonged gas price collapse (sub-$2/Mcf) would make this debt problematic.

4. Financial History: The Cyclicality Problem

Income Statement Trends

Share Count Dilution

Shares have grown from 255M to 616M since 2019 -- a 142% increase driven by serial acquisitions (Rice Energy, Tug Hill, Equitrans, Olympus). This massive dilution means EPS growth understates aggregate business growth. EQT has grown primarily through M&A, not organic per-share value creation.

Capital Allocation

EQT's capital allocation priority has been clear: (1) pay down debt from Equitrans merger, (2) small dividend, (3) opportunistic acquisitions. Buybacks have been minimal despite a $2B authorized program ($622M used since 2021). This is rational -- paying down $7.3B in debt at these interest rates is the right priority.

5. Vertically Integrated Model: The Equitrans Advantage

Three Business Segments (Post-Equitrans Merger)

Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) -- Strategic Asset

• MVP Mainline: 303 miles, 42" diameter, 2.0 Bcf/day capacity. WV to VA. EQT has contracted 1.29 Bcf/day through June 2044 (~19yr weighted avg term).
• MVP Southgate: 31-mile extension into NC. 0.55 Bcf/day. Expected in-service mid-2028. Cost: $370-430M.
• MVP Boost: Compression additions to increase MVP Mainline capacity by 0.6 Bcf/day. Expected mid-2028. Cost: $400-540M.
• Con Edison Interest Acquisition: In Jan 2026, EQT acquired additional MVP A and MVP C interests for ~$212M.

MVP is hugely strategic -- it provides Southeast market access, reducing EQT's exposure to the Appalachian basis differential (Appalachian gas trades at a discount to Henry Hub due to pipeline constraints). More capacity = better realized prices.

LNG Commitments -- Global Demand Access

• Three 20-year LNG offtake agreements: 4.5 MTPA total (3.0 MTPA from ~2030, 1.5 MTPA from 2031)
• One 20-year LNG tolling agreement: up to 2.0 MTPA (no earlier than 2030)
• Some of these are subject to final investment decisions (FID) on construction

6.5 MTPA of LNG capacity = roughly 0.85 Bcf/day of gas demand. This is significant -- it locks in long-term international pricing exposure, which can be much higher than US domestic prices. LNG exports at $8-12/MMBtu vs. domestic $3-4/MMBtu is a meaningful price uplift, though EQT's netback depends on tolling vs. offtake structure.

Blackstone Midstream JV

EQT announced a $3.5B midstream joint venture with Blackstone Credit & Insurance, selling a non-controlling interest in its gathering assets. This monetizes midstream value while retaining operational control. The Blackstone affiliate contributed $3B+ in capital. This is a smart move to reduce debt while keeping the integrated benefits.

6. The Buffett/OXY Parallel: Same Thesis, Different Fuel

Key Differences

7. Can EQT 10x? Working Backward from the Bull Case

The 10x Framework for Commodity Companies

For a non-commodity company, 10x typically comes from: revenue growth + margin expansion + multiple expansion. For a commodity company, 10x comes from ONE thing: buying at the bottom of the commodity cycle and holding through the top. There is no moat, no flywheel, no compounding advantage. The commodity price IS the business.

10x Entry Price Calculation

8. AGI Disruption Risk: The Double-Edged Sword

Natural gas for data center power is a paradoxical investment: AGI creates the demand (more compute = more power = more gas) but AGI could also destroy the demand (better tech = less gas needed).

AGI Score Components

9. Leopold Aschenbrenner Position Analysis

Position Timeline (13F Filings)

Estimated P&L: Avg cost basis ~$54.15/share, current price $64.64. Gain: ~14% or ~$5.4M on remaining position. But he likely also profited on the shares sold during Q3-Q4.

What the Trimming Tells Us

• Position sizing signal: EQT went from a meaningful position (~$125M, potentially 3-5% of AUM) to a small residual (~1% of AUM). This is not a high-conviction hold.
• Rotation signal: Leopold has been rotating into smaller, cheaper infrastructure plays (Bitcoin miners like CORZ, fuel cell companies like BE). EQT may have been a "park the capital" play while he found better opportunities.
• Thesis expiration: If Leopold's thesis was "gas prices will rise in 2025," the thesis played out (Henry Hub went from ~$2.50 to $3.50-4.00+). He may be taking the win.
• Not a Buffett position: This is clearly a trading position, not a long-term holding. Buffett has been adding to OXY for 3+ years and shows no signs of selling.

10. Competitive Position & Cost Structure

EQT vs. Other Gas Producers

Cost Structure (FY2025 per Mcfe)

11. Floor Price Analysis

Asset-Based Floor

Moderate Floor (More Likely Scenario)

12. Conclusion: The Investment Decision Matrix

Summary of Key Findings

The Honest Assessment

When Would We Buy EQT?

Lessons for the Broader Portfolio

1. Commodity companies are inherently poor 10x candidates from any price above cyclical trough. The math only works if you buy at the bottom, and bottoms are impossible to time.
2. "AI beneficiary" is not the same as "great investment." EQT benefits from AI demand, but that doesn't make it cheap, moated, or compounding.
3. Smart money trimming is a strong signal. When Leopold builds a position and then sells 67% in two quarters, it means the trade was tactical, not structural. Don't copy a trade that's already been exited.
4. The Buffett/OXY parallel is imperfect. Buffett bought OXY at ~1x PV-10 and is still adding. Leopold bought EQT at ~2x PV-10 and is selling. The entry price matters enormously in commodity investing.
5. Physical assets provide real floors -- EQT's $15-27 floor range is meaningful. But a stock can trade at floor value for years (see 2019-2021). Floor value is not a catalyst.

Appendix A: Price History & Key Events

Appendix B: Data Sources

• SEC XBRL: Company facts API for historical financials (CIK 33213)
• 10-K Filing: FY2025 annual report filed 2026-02-18 (accession 0000033213-26-000018)
• yfinance: Market data, balance sheet, income statement, cash flow
• Leopold 13F: Situational Awareness LP quarterly filings (CIK 0002045724)
• EIA STEO: March 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook for gas price/production forecasts
• IEA Electricity 2024: Data center power demand estimates
• AGI Score: AWB scoring system, Score 8/10 (March 2026)